SECURING THE IDENTITY OF A BLUETOOTH MASTER DEVICE (BD_ADDR) AGAINST EAVESDROPPING BY PREVENTING THE ASSOCIATION OF A DETECTED FREQUENCY HOPPING SEQUENCE WITH THE IDENTITY OF A PARTICULAR BLUETOOTH DEVICE

摘要

Rather than computing the frequency hopping sequence used in Bluetooth networks as a known function of a universal time parameter and the master's Bluetooth device address (BD_ADDR), the frequency hopping sequence is changed each time a new session begins on one of the devices. An additional random number is selected, communicated to the devices associated with the session and used to calculate the frequency hopping sequence in combination with the universal time parameter and the master's Bluetooth device address (BD_ADDR). An intentional eavesdropper attempting to determine the frequency hopping sequence being used by a proxipate device by listening to the frequency bands in which energy is present will be unable to correlate the detected frequency hopping sequence to a specific BD_ADDR.