Secure identification system combining forensic/biometric population database and issuance of relationship-specific identifiers toward enhanced privacy

摘要

An ID infrastructure design to combat identity theft and identity fraud while enhancing individual privacy is disclosed. The schema revolves around two persons who want to do business non-anonymously (i.e. with strong bad faith traceability), and a centralized identification service IS that fields queries from one of them (the requestor R) who requests the identity of the other U. The identification service IS owns a highly secure forensic/biometric population database wherein R and U are represented individually. Upon positive match to their respective personas in the database, R receives an identifier for U, issued for R's exclusive use. Unlike a universal identifier (e.g. SSN), the identifier issued is relationship-specific, i.e. it allows the person being identified U to be known by a different identifier in each business relationship he establishes. The identification service IS remembers the identifiers it issues and to whom, and will always return the same identifier when queried by R for the identity of U, thus affording R the ability to impose lifetime ID stability on U (or any person he does business with). The identification service IS is able to provide location tipoffs to law enforcement arising from ID queries involving wanted persons, imposing inescapable traceability on bad faith actors. The two major advantages of this ID infrastructure design are 1) an integrated solution to fraud-resistant ID, enhanced individual privacy, bad faith traceability, checks on organizational identity frauds, and 2) a centralized architecture which simplifies maintenance of security over invaluable forensic/biometric data assets, and provides an efficient way to deliver secure identification services throughout society.