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Is there a more effective way to reduce carbon emissions? An alternative to emissions trading and carbon taxation

机译:有没有更有效的减少碳排放的方法?排放交易和碳税的替代方案

摘要

This paper considers a new scheme, the Tender-Price Allocation Mechanism, which focuses carbon factor cost expenditure on abatement rather than just revenue transfers. In Australia and internationally, we have witnessed intense discussions concerning the best policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The two main proposals are a carbon tax (CT) and an emissions trading system (ETS). The latter is favoured over the former mainly because, first, it can set a reduction target and, second, because increasing taxation is never palatable politically. The debate concerning the relative merits of these policies has tended to crowd out discussions about alternative schemes.This is surprising because both policies have potential problems, both in implementation and in achieving their goals. The ETS is a ‘quota’ policy which deviates from economists’ preference for ‘tariff’ schemes, particularly in the context of international trade. Also, since both are ‘stick’ rather than ‘carrot’ policies that raise prices that are passed on to consumers, they depend upon there being a high enough price elasticity of demand to achieve significant reductions in demand. If demand is price inelastic then little will be achieved without very high increases in a carbon price with serious consequences for low income consumers. In particular, neither scheme addresses the consequences of increased cost or decreased emission reduction as a result of uncertainty.This paper considers a new scheme, the Tender-Price Allocation Mechanism, which focuses carbon factor cost expenditure on abatement rather than just revenue transfers. It is a scheme that reduces uncertainty and the costs of uncertainty for both firms and regulators. It also incorporates a suite of incentives that compensates for the externalities associated with abatement investment.
机译:本文考虑了一种新的计划,即招标价格分配机制,该机制将碳要素成本支出集中在减排上,而不仅仅是收入转移。在澳大利亚和国际上,我们目睹了关于减少温室气体排放的最佳政策的激烈讨论。两个主要建议是碳税(CT)和排放交易系统(ETS)。后者之所以受到前者的青睐,主要是因为它首先可以设定削减目标,其次,因为增加税收在政治上从不讨好。关于这些政策的相对优点的辩论倾向于将有关替代方案的讨论排挤出去,这令人惊讶,因为这两种政策在实施和实现目标方面均存在潜在问题。 ETS是一项“配额”政策,与经济学家对“关税”计划的偏爱背道而驰,特别是在国际贸易的背景下。此外,由于两者都是“坚持”政策,而不是“胡萝卜”政策,它们会提高传递给消费者的价格,因此,它们依赖于需求的价格弹性是否足够大,以实现需求的大幅减少。如果需求是价格无弹性的,那么如果碳价格没有非常高的增长,那么收效甚微,这将给低收入消费者带来严重后果。尤其是,这两种方案都无法解决不确定性导致的成本增加或减排量减少的后果。本文考虑了一种新的方案,即招标价格分配机制,该机制将碳要素成本支出重点放在减排上,而不仅仅是收益转移。这是一种为公司和监管机构降低不确定性和不确定性成本的方案。它还纳入了一套激励措施,以补偿与减排投资相关的外部性。

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