The role of third party intervention in Africa's civil conflicts: The case of South Africa's peace mission in Burundi (1999-2004)

摘要

ABSTRACTudThis research investigates the role played by external actors in contemporary Africanudcivil conflicts with specific attention to South Africa’s leading role in addressingudBurundi’s intractable civil conflict. The inquiry was guided by looking at SA’s effortsudin managing Burundi’s peace process in partnership with key external parties such asudthe Regional Initiative for peace in Burundi, AU and the UN; and by examining theudlevel of success of SA’s involvement in the peace process and limitations encounteredudin pursuing diplomatic/political and military efforts aimed at resolving the civiludconflict. The theories of conflict resolution and protracted social change, andudscholarly and policy literature on intervention were drawn upon to frame the research.udThe struggle for political power explains the key root cause to Burundi’s civiludconflict; rival politicians manipulated ethnicity and the past injustices, which areudrooted in colonial policies of divide and rule, as tools in an attempt to accede to powerudand thereby, gain economic advantage at the expense of others. SA diplomatic effortsudplayed an important role in addressing this by advocating for political and militaryudpower sharing.udIn order to reconcile and manage differences in approaches that were advocated to deal withudthe Burundi civil conflict, SA mobilized for support in Burundi’s neighbouring countries soudas to back a peaceful solution to address the conflict. Further, in an effort to bolster itsudtroops and, therefore, expand operations designed to promote peace in Burundi, SAudhad to merge into the African Mission in Burundi, and cooperate with the UN in orderudfor the latter to render impetus to the peace process by, providing necessary resourcesudand political support for the Burundi peace mission, and subsequently to assume theudmission by taking over from the African mission.udAlthough SA’s troop deployment provided protection for the former Hutu exileudpoliticians and thereby, encouraged them to participate in negotiations and theudtransitional government, which participation increased chances of success in the peaceudprocess, however, SA did not do much in peacekeeping under the UN due toudinadequate military equipments; civilians continued to be killed in the presence of SAudtroops, even though, under the UN their role extended to include civilian protection. udTo the extent that SA’s intensive diplomatic efforts resulted in the Arusha Peace andudReconciliation Agreement for Burundi, however, a number of Burundian parties didudnot participate in the signing of the agreement and the rebel movements wereudexcluded from the process. Thus, the Arusha peace process failed to attain consensusudin addressing Burundi’s contentious issues.udAlthough the UN peacekeepers in Burundi, of which SA was part, had a Chapter VIIudmandate to enforce the peace of which civilian protection was part of their mission,udthey did not exercise it. Intervention was constrained by the Burundian government;udthey argued that the ultimate authority in maintaining security throughout the countryudrested on them. Moreover, it is difficult if not impossible to observe UN traditionaludpeacekeeping norms while at the same time having to implement the responsibility toudprotect, which has been occasioned by the post-Cold War world, in which humanudrights have gained wider recognition, and international norms of sovereignty and noninterventionudredefined. Thus, strict observance of the UN traditional peacekeepingudnorms, inhibit intervention aimed to protect civilians facing catastrophicudcircumstances or under imminent threat.