At a crossroad: the GATS telecom framework and neo-patrimonial states: the politics of telecom reform in Kenya

摘要

The liberalisation of domestic telecommunication (telecom) markets has become aworldwide trend. As a result, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),evolving from deliberations within the World Trade Organisation (WTO), has beenheralded as the mechanism with which to effect telecom liberalisation domestically. Forcountries in Africa, the GATS instruments have been translated as a means to establishthe principles required for an effective telecom industry supported by key institutions inpolicy, regulation and implementation. However, the analysis of relevant literature ontelecom in Africa has tended to focus on technological developments based on currentobservable outcomes. This methodology is inadequate because it fails to account for thecontext-specific nature of the policy arena and framework shaping telecom outcomes.I argue that we must consider telecom outcomes by understanding the nature of politicalinstitutions domestically and their interaction with the international arena. To explicatethis intersection of ideas, I draw on two seemingly independent theories, Neopatrimonialismand New Institutional Economics (NIE) with reference to the works ofvan de Walle (2001) and North (1990) respectively, to shed light on the nature of theKenyan political context and the value of the GATS as an instrument that facilitatescredibility and reduces opportunistic ex-post behaviour. It is contended in this study, thatfor the Kenyan Government, the value of the GATS accession lies in the legitimising rolethat it facilitates in accessing funds from the international community. This study thushighlights the inevitable tension that arises when domestic policy-reform goals arejuxtaposed with international trade obligations undertaken through treaty accession andinformed by a liberalisation agenda.A qualitative approach was used to collect the data and involved interviews anddocumentary analysis. The findings suggest that Kenya is partially in compliance with itsGATS telecom commitments. However, this partial reform results from patrimonialtendencies in Kenya and is exacerbated by the need to attract hard currency through aidpackages that dictate the nature of the policy process and the relationship between Kenyaand the international community.In conclusion, even with policy reforms, state agents always find ways to maintain orcreate clientelist practises. Unless such reform is accompanied by political changes thatprovide checks and balances on institutions and state agents, reform policies on their ownwill not create an effective telecom sector. To truly evaluate telecom reform therefore, wemust appreciate the context-specific nature of policy making.