Still a chance for negotiated peace : applying the lessons of the CSCE with a view to a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Middle East

摘要

The recent election of Benjamin Netanjahu as the new prime minister of Israel has created apprehensions,particularly among the countryu27s Arab neighbours, that the peace process in the Middle East couldresult in deadlock or even fail. First Arab reactions to the change in the political leadership have beencharacterised by a mistrust of Netanjahu and of his coalition government. However, both the summitmeeting of the Arab League held on 22/23 June, 1996 and the diplomatic activities of leading Arabpoliticians have made it clear that those countries which have already concluded peace treaties withIsrael have no wish to jeopardise them. Even Syria whose negotiations with Israel were suspendedmonths ago does not seem to wish to exacerbate the situation.Against this background, Israel and Jordan are the countries which could have a key role to play: Bilaterally,their relations have already improved considerably on the basis of the peace treaty of 1994.But this treaty also contains a multilateral provision which still remains to be fulfilled: this is that bothParties have committed themselves to the creation of a Conference on Security and Co-operation inthe Middle East (CSCME) along the lines of the Helsinki (CSCE) process. There is to date, however,no evidence of any activity on either side to im plement this part of the peace treaty.This Report examines the question as to whether or not it would make sense to create a CSCME inaddition, or as an alternative to either the Madrid peace process which seems to stagger along tenaciously,or the Mediterranean conference, initiated by the European Union some months ago, whichalso involves part of the Middle East region. Since the authors of the Israeli-Jordan plan obviously hadthe u27success-modelu27 of the CSCE in mind, this Report also looks at some of the basic factors and circumstancesresponsible for the success of the CSCE and tries to discover whether or not comparableconditions exist in the Middle East, particularly:· a geographical delimitation of the region that makes sense politically and ensures that all partiesinvolved in conflicts in the region and necessary for their solution are included in the negotiations;· the presence of u27importantu27 parties prepared to take the initiative in extending invitations, in sponsoringor moderating such negotiations;· the willingness of the parties involved in regional conflicts both to contribute to their solu tionwithout recourse to military action or other means of force (except for the purpose of self-defence)and to consider future developments u27open-mindedlyu27 in the sense that fron tiers and zones of influencecan be amended by peaceful means and by agreement;· a broad concept of u27securityu27 which includes both co-operation as a means of achieving commonsecurity, and package deals to arrive at a balanced compensation of give and take; and finally· a willingness to embark on a lengthy process of compensation of interests, trust in the con fidencebuilding quality of verifiable agreements and the healthy effect of implementation debates wherealleged cases of non-implementation must be explained.Although all the conditions under which a possible CSCME would have to be organised are too intricateto justify their comparison with the European situation of the early seventies, the following criteriaprovide a useful framework for a debate:· today it is no longer possible to juxtapose the states of the Middle East against each other as antagonistsof an East-West conflict, neither can these countries profit any more finan cially from sucha confrontation. On the contrary: the global situation has developed in the opposite direction, manifestinga general tendency and willingness to help bring peace to the region, and even to pay forit;· one Middle East state appears to fulfil the main criteria required to extend an invitation toCSCME-consultations, namely Egypt. The country has the necessary political weight, dip lomaticrelations with all of the potential participants, and has for many years actively pro moted the peaceprocess;· although u27refraining from the threat or use of forceu27 is not yet a principle applied by all par ties toconflicts in the region, it does at least figure in all declarations governing the relations of Israelwith Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian Council;· it is furthermore an open question whether the parties to a CSCME will comprehend, dur ing themultilateral negotiating process, that mutual and common security cannot be reached overnight:intermediate steps will first be required in order to build confidence; and that u27conventional thinkingu27can only be overcome by open debates on the implementation of, or the difficulties in implementingagreed measures.All of these are arguments in favour of a negotiated peace. This is the aim of the Madrid peace processwhich started in October 1991, and which was shaped after the CSCE model. The same is also true forthe Mediterranean Conference, convened in Barcelona by the European Community in November1995, in which a part of the Middle East region is represented. This Report tries to establish thereforewhy u27Madridu27 has not so far become a synonym for success in the way u27Helsinkiu27 did, and why Barcelonacannot replace a CSCME.The Madrid peace negotiations run along four bilateral tracks - those between Israel and the Palestinians,and with Jordan, the Lebanon and Syria; multilateral negotiations are held in five workinggroups, each addressing a specific subject and involving a great number of states of which only a fewactually belong to the region. A comparison of these two levels of negotiation shows that the bilateralone is the more important of the two. When difficulties arise on a bilateral track, talks on the samesubject then stagnate in the multilateral working group: the September 1993 Oslo agreement which inturn led to the Gaza-Jericho agreement, and the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan of October1994 stimulated talks at the multilateral level.Thus, the structure of the Madrid peace process differs from that of the CSCE in two impor tant ways:in its focus on bilateral negotiations, and in the open-endedness of its multilateral negotiations inwhich an ever greater number of non-regional states and organisations partici pate. Each of these factorsappears to have been detrimental to a smooth development of the process. The multilateral negotiationsin particular suffer from repeated bouts of stagnation. Positive post-1993 results were due toprogress in the bilateral negotiations between Israel and the PLO, and between Israel and Jordan. TheMadrid process therefore can draw nearer the aims of its initiators only if there were to be progress inthe negotiations between Israel and Syria, and between Israel and the Lebanon. Even then, however,the final aim of a compre hensive peace in the region still cannot be realised since two of its states areexcluded: Iraq and Iran. The very fact that their present regimes are both notorious trouble-shootersand Is raelu27s arch-enemies should induce the initiators of a CSCME to bind them in into any lastingregional settlement. There is also reason to believe that the large number of outer-regional participantsinvolved in the Madrid process is less than helpful from the point of view that their understanding ofu27peaceu27 only partly coincides with that of the states of the region; furthermore, they do not always playthe role which the regional parties expect of them.The Barcelona Mediterranean Conference, on the other hand, is of very recent date and the measures ithas so far contemplated - in particular preparations for a Free Trade Zone - carry a fulfilment deadlineas far into the future as 2010. Nothing very definite can as yet be said about the success of this endeavour.One point, however, is quite clear: its main emphasis will be on economic co-operation, in particularwith the Maghreb and much less with the Middle East region.Since both u27Madridu27 and u27Barcelonau27 appear to have encountered difficulties in realising a comprehensivepeace settlement for the Middle East, it does indeed seem worthwhile considering a new departure:to promote the idea of a u27Conference on Security and Co- operation in the Middle Eastu27.The participants of this Conference ought to comprise the states of the u27central zoneu27, i.e. Israel, itsArab neighbours and the Palestinian Council; the member-states of the Gulf Co- operation Council;and also those states which to varying degrees are involved in conflicts geographically located betweenthe Mediterranean and the Persian-Arabian Gulf, i.e. Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Cyprus. The invitationshould be based on one of the most important criteria which enabled the Europeans and NorthAmericans to accept the Finnish invitation to the u27Helsinki Consultationsu27: the participation of governmentsin the consultations and negotiations does not constitute a legal recognition of the existing politicalconditions in the region. All those states and organisations outside the Middle East region whichhave for years engaged themselves politically, militarily or economically in the area, such as the UnitedStates, the United Nations, the Russian Federation and the European Union, should play an importantrole in the process, but rather that of a moderator deprived of the right to vote, whilst otherinterested states such as Japan could be given observer status (as in the case of the OSCE) - to underlinethe character of a CSCME as a regional conference which places the interests of the parties directlyconcerned at the centre of its attention.It should in principle be possible to put all questions of security and co-operation which are of importanceto the region, on the agenda of a CSCME. It seems, however, likely that agree ments can bereached more easily on some subject matters than on others. The parties to the Conference would thereforebe well advised to start off with only five of the ten principles of the Helsinki Final Act, i.e.refraining from the threat or use of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes, non-intervention in internalaffairs, co-operation among states and the fulfilment in good faith of obligations under internationallaw. Such a catalogue commonly agreed between the participants of a CSCME would in itselfalready constitute a great success.· The principle u27Refraining from the threat or use of forceu27 is part of the Charter of the United Nationsand should be supported by all regional parties to the Conference, even by those which atpresent do not represent a state authority.· The principle u27Peaceful settlement of disputesu27 might induce Iran and Iraq - if invited to the Conference- to return to a system of international law to which they had already obliged themselveswhen joining the United Nations, since their participation in this Conference would put an end totheir isolation.· The principle u27Non-intervention in internal affairsu27 is also a part of the UN Charter and fre quentlyinvoked by Israel and its Arab neighbours. The last paragraph of this principle, as formulated inthe Helsinki Final Act, is of particular interest under present Middle East conditions: The participantsof the CSCE agreed that they will u27...refrain from direct or indirect assistance to terrorist activities,or to subversive or other activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime ofanother participating State.u27· The principle u27Co-operation among Statesu27 opens up possibilities for fields of interstate relationsbeyond the intricate security problems and the fundamental differences behind them, and provideparticipants with opportunities to better understanding and appreciation of the importance and usefulnessof good neighbourly relations.· Finally, the principle u27Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international lawu27 - the Xthprinciple of the Helsinki Final Act - would seem to be suitable for inclusion in a Final Documentof a first CSCME since all parties to conflicts in the Middle East consider it very important to fulfilacrimoniously any treaty once it has been concluded.On the other hand, the Conference could be blocked at an early stage if participants attempted duringthe first round of negotiations to agree on common formulae of controversial principles such as sovereignequality, inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity and equal rights and self-determinationof peoples, or similarly if they attempted to define together the meaning of human rightsu27 criteria suchas freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief. When embarking on an inter-cultural dialogue onhuman rights issues, participants must be very cautious. By no means ought this dialogue to be overshadowedby other topics nor should it be misused as negotiating fat to obtain better results in otherfields. The criteria worked out by the 1990 CSCE Conference in Copenhagen on the subject of NationalMinorities could be studied with a view to their suitability for the settlement of inter-ethnic conflictsin the Middle-East.A CSCME would also be well advised, in the beginning, not to be too ambitious in terms of reducingmilitary hardware and to content itself, like the CSCE, with a discussion of Confi dence BuildingMeasures such as the prior notification of major military manoeuvres and the voluntary exchange ofobservers. Since the potential participantsu27 interests in economic co-op eration seem to differ considerably,they would be well advised to start off by ending all forms of boycotts and similar restrictions.The facilitation of tourism across the border, family reunification, a better exchange of information,youth exchanges and other such steps might later culminate in a vast system of international arrangementssuch as the u27human dimensionu27 of the CSCE/OSCE.***The co-operation of the two authors of this Report stems from a lecture read by Götz von Groll on13th March, 1996 entitled u27Can the lessons learned from the CSCE be helpful in set tling the conflictsin the Middle East?u27 which was part of the 6th spring academy of the PRIF on the subject: u27The Mediterranean- a zone of unrestu27 conducted by Berthold Meyer. Götz von Groll was the desk officer ofAuswärtiges Amt co-ordinating the CSCE-policy of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germanyfrom 1971 to 1977. During these years, he participated in all CSCE consultations, the formulationof the CSCE-Final Act in Geneva as well as the Foreign Ministers and the Summit Conference inHelsinki 1973/75. In 1977, he was head of the Federal German Delegation for the preparation of thefirst CSCE Follow-up meeting in Belgrade. Berthold Meyer participated in the seventies in a numberof international CSCE conferences of youth organisations, and directs, since 1981, PRIFu27s research onCSCE/OSCE, European security problems including European-Mediterranean relations.