In a real-world situation, it is usually the case that the construciton of transportation infrastructure such as highways is determined by way of electoral profess. This paper describes a Condorect voting model to construct highways in a linear study area for a fixed voter distribution. Voters enjoy a highway as users, but they finance its construction sa taxpayers. Acoordingly, the voters face a trade-off between accessibility and construction cost. First, we examine how the direct voting decision influence social welfare and individual utility. Second, we show that raising distance-based tax improves both efficiency and equiry. Third, we reveal that for high construction costs, a two-stage voting to choose the distance-based tax before higyway construction leads to zero distance-based tax and half-construction scheme that creates the worst welfare. Forth, we inverstigate how welfare and utility are offected by the level of administrative decentralization.
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