首页> 外文OA文献 >Why u22Democracyu22 and u22Drifteru22 Firms can have Abnormal Returns: The Joint Importance of Corporate Governance and Abnormal Accruals in Separating Winners from Losers
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Why u22Democracyu22 and u22Drifteru22 Firms can have Abnormal Returns: The Joint Importance of Corporate Governance and Abnormal Accruals in Separating Winners from Losers

机译:为什么企业会产生异常收益:公司治理与异常应计制的共同重要性使赢家与失败者脱节

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摘要

Do managers exercise accounting discretion in an opportunistic or efficient manner? Good governance structures, which mitigate agency costs, are necessary to ensure that the accounting information supplied by management is not opportunistically manipulated. The output of quality accounting information, in turn, serves as an input to better governance structures. Thus, governance and earnings quality (EQ) are inexorably linked through a complementarity relationship. This suggests two previously unexamined relationships. Firstly, the governance effects on performance in the influential paper by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) is overrated without good EQ, measured by the magnitude of abnormal accruals (AA), as an input. I find evidence that removing firms with Low AA attenuates the good governance (Democracy) portfolio returns to no different from zero over the period of 1991-2008. Good governance per se no longer pays off. Isolating the long portfolio of Democracy firms with Low AA generates a positive abnormal return of 10.5 percent per year from 1991 to 2008. Secondly, the uncertainty associated with the abnormal accruals signal is interactively resolved with information about the firm‟s governance structure, and the unique pairing of the signals contains unique information about the future prospects of the firm. Thus, firms with high or extreme income-increasing AA, when accompanied by weak (Dictatorship) and mixed (Drifter) governance structures, have negative abnormal future returns as predicted in the seminal paper by Sloan (1996), but Democracy firms have positive abnormal returns. The results suggest either that abnormal accruals are a coarse measure of EQ or earnings manipulation for good governance firms, or that their shareholders benefit from u22earnings managementu22 because the high abnormal accruals signals future performance. Overall, the results highlight the joint importance of governance and abnormal accruals in contributing to the total information environment to separate winners from losers.
机译:管理者是否会以机会主义或高效的方式行使会计自由裁量权?良好的治理结构可减轻代理机构的成本,对于确保管理层提供的会计信息不会受到机会操纵是必要的。质量会计信息的输出反过来又是更好的治理结构的输入。因此,治理和盈余质量(EQ)通过互补关系紧密地联系在一起。这暗示了两个以前未经检查的关系。首先,在Gompers,Ishii和Metrick(2003)的有影响力的论文中,治理对绩效的影响被高估了,而没有良好的情商(EQ),以异常应计(AA)的幅度作为输入。我发现有证据表明,删除具有低AA的公司会削弱1991年至2008年期间的良好治理(民主)投资组合收益,从零开始没有变化。善政本身已不再奏效。从1991年到2008年,隔离具有低AA值的民主公司的长期投资组合会产生每年10.5%的正异常收益。其次,与异常应计信号相关的不确定性通过有关公司治理结构的信息以交互方式解决,信号的唯一配对包含有关公司未来前景的唯一信息。因此,具有高或极高AA收益的公司,同时伴随着薄弱的(专政)和混合的(分散的)治理结构,如斯隆(Sloan,1996年)在开创性论文中所预测的那样,未来的负收益是负的,而民主的公司则是正的。返回。结果表明,不正常的应计额是衡量良好治理公司的情商或盈余操纵的粗略度量,或者它们的股东可以从收益管理中受益,因为较高的不正常应计额表示未来的业绩。总体而言,结果突出了治理和异常应计项目在为整个信息环境做出贡献以将赢家与输家区分开来方面的共同重要性。

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    KEE Koon Boon;

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  • 年度 2010
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  • 正文语种 {"code":"en","name":"English","id":9}
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