Japan, Canada, and the U.S. ballistic missile defense program: A comparative analysis of middle-power relations with a superpower.

摘要

Ballistic missile defense (BMD) is a significant and controversial security issue in the world today. The United States (U.S.) is the leader in BMD development and deployment. This thesis analyzes the differing orientations to BMD of two key U.S. allies, Japan and Canada. The central questions asked in the thesis are: Why did Japan choose to join the U.S.-led BMD program as an active cooperative country in 2003, while Canada chose not to formally join in 2005? What inferences can we draw about BMD politics from these decisions? These questions were answered in three steps. First, I developed an analytic approach inspired by Putnam's two-level game theory. Second, I applied this approach to my two case studies. Japan-U.S. and Canada-U.S. BMD relations between 1983 and 2008 were analyzed at two levels, domestic and international, which resulted in identifying six international-related factors and two domestic-related factors influencing Japan's and Canada's BMD decision-making process. And third, the two case studies were compared and analyzed. I conclude that the basis for the two countries' foreign policy decisions was significantly different. Japanese foreign policy decision-making was rooted in realist thinking, while Canadian foreign policy decision-making was rooted in a combination of liberal internationalist and realist thinking. --P. ii.