In late 2005, a number of German open ended funds suffered significant withdrawals by unit holders. The crisis was precipitated by a long term bear market in German property investment and the fact that these funds offered short term liquidity to unit holders but had low levels of liquidity in the fund. A more controversial suggestion was that the crisis was exacerbated by a perception that the valuations of the fund were too infrequent and inaccurate. As units are priced by reference to these valuations with no secondary market, the valuation process is central to the process. There is no direct evidence that these funds were over-valued but there is circumstantial evidence and this paper examines the indirect evidence of the process to see whether the hypothesis that valuation is an issue for the German funds holds any credibility. It also discusses whether there is a wider issue for other funds of this nature or whether it is a parochial problem confined to Germany. The conclusions are that there is reason to believe that German valuation processes make over-valuation in a recession more likely than in other countries and that more direct research into the German valuation system is required to identify the issues which need to be addressed to make the valuation system more trusted.ud
展开▼
机译:在2005年末,一些德国开放式基金遭受了单位持有人的大量提款。这场危机是由于德国房地产投资的长期熊市以及这些基金为单位持有人提供短期流动性而基金的流动性水平较低而加剧的。一个更具争议性的建议是,人们认为该基金的估值太少而且不准确,从而加剧了这场危机。由于在没有二级市场的情况下参考这些估价为单位定价,因此估价过程是该过程的核心。没有直接证据表明这些基金被高估,但有间接证据,本文研究了这一过程的间接证据,以查看估值是德国基金问题的假设是否具有可信度。它还讨论了这类其他基金是否存在更广泛的问题,还是仅局限于德国的狭och问题。结论是,有理由相信,德国的估值程序比其他国家更容易导致经济衰退中的高估,并且需要对德国的估值体系进行更直接的研究,以识别出需要解决的问题。评估系统更受信任。 ud
展开▼