Password–Authenticated Group Key Establishment from Smooth Projective Hash Functions

摘要

Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols allow users sharing a password to agree upon a high entropy secret. Thus, they can be implemented without complex infrastructures that typically involve public keys and certificates. In this paper, a provably secure password-authenticated protocol for group key establishment in the common reference string (CRS) model is presented. While prior constructions of the group (PAKE) can be found in the literature, most of them rely on idealized assumptions, which we do not make here. Furthermore, our protocol is quite efficient, as regardless of the number of involved participants it can be implemented with only three communication rounds. We use a (by now classical) trick of Burmester and Desmedt for deriving group key exchange protocols using a two-party construction as the main building block. In our case, the two-party PAKE used as a base is a one-round protocol by Katz and Vaikuntanathan, which in turn builds upon a special kind of smooth projective hash functions (KV-SPHFs). Smooth projective hash functions (SPHFs) were first introduced by Cramer and Shoup (2002) as a valuable cryptographic primitive for deriving provable secure encryption schemes. These functions and their variants proved useful in many other scenarios. We use here as a main tool a very strong type of SPHF, introduced by Katz and Vaikuntanathan for building a one-round password based two party key exchange protocol. As evidenced by Ben Hamouda et al. (2013), KV-SPHFs can be instantiated on Cramer–Shoup ciphertexts, thus yielding very efficient (and pairing free) constructions.