Route-cost-assignment with joint user and operator behavior as a many-to-one stable matching assignment game

摘要

We propose a generalized market equilibrium model using assignment gamecriteria for evaluating transportation systems that consist of both operatorsand users: fixed route transit, multimodal systems, and Mobility-as-a-Servicein general. The model finds stable pricing and matches between users in anetwork with a set of routes with line capacities. The proposed model gives aset of stable outcomes instead of single point pricing that allows operators todesign their ticket pricing based on a desired mechanism or policy (as opposedto other matching studies that focus on operating a specific mechanism design).We look at three different examples to test our model. As a case study weevaluate taxi ridesharing in NYC. Based on the taxi data and study area inLower Manhattan, the model justifies a market share of 71.8% of users thatwould take shared rides. Sharing taxi results in a 31.4% decrease in travelmileage. The model suggests that adopting a policy that can require passengersto walk up to 1 block away to meet with a shared taxi would require theoperating cost savings to exceed the $0.44/traveler by another $0.13 if they donot wish to turn away any of these passengers.