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The Presence of a Powerful Retailer on Dynamic Collecting Closed-Loop Supply Chain From a Sustainable Innovation Perspective

机译:来自可持续创新视角的动态收集闭环供应链的强大零售商的存在

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摘要

In this study, the presence of a powerful retailer in the dynamic collecting closed-loop supply chain is considered. The supply chain consists of a manufacturer and a retailer who is responsible for the used-product collection. Specifically, we have considered three settings, that is, no channel leader, the manufacturer as the leader and the retailer as the leader. The steady equilibrium and the optimal control strategies are derived in different channel power structures utilizing the open-loop control strategy method. By the comparison of three models, we found that the system with manufacturer leading results in the lowest return rate in the three models. If the transfer price of the used-product is low, the presence of a power retailer would result in a higher return rate, which is beneficial for decreasing the market price for the consumers. When the transfer price is quite high, the scenario with no channel leader in the supply chain would result in a higher return rate. However, the numerical comparison results of the profit rate of the supply chain members indicate that both manufacturer and retailer prefer themselves to be the channel leader rather than the other channel member as the leader. This means that although the presence of a power retailer is beneficial for the collecting efficiency, it is not enough to increase the profit of the supply chain members. The manufacturer should transfer all unit cost savings to the retailer in the scenario of manufacturer leading and no one leading.
机译:在这项研究中,考虑了动态收集闭环供应链中强大的零售商的存在。供应链包括制造商和负责二手产品集合的零售商。具体来说,我们已经考虑了三种设置,即没有渠道领导者,制造商作为领导者和零售商作为领导者。利用开环控制策略方法的不同通道功率结构导出稳定的平衡和最佳控制策略。通过三种模型的比较,我们发现,制造商的系统导致三种模型中的最低回报率。如果二手产品的转移价格低,则零售商的存在将导致更高的回报率,这有利于降低消费者的市场价格。当转让价格相当高时,供应链中没有通道领导者的情景将导致更高的回报率。然而,供应链成员利润率的数值比较结果表明,制造商和零售商都喜欢自己是渠道领导者而不是其他渠道成员作为领导者。这意味着虽然存在权力零售商的存在是有益的收集效率,但增加供应链成员的利润是不够的。制造商应在制造商领先的情况下将所有单位成本节省给零售商,没有人领导。

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