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Dynamic Game-Theoretic Models to Determine the Value of Intrusion Detection Systems in the Face of Uncertainty

机译:面对不确定性确定入侵检测系统价值的动态博弈模型

摘要

Firms lose millions of dollars every year to cyber-attacks and the risk to these companies is growing exponentially. The threat to monetary and intellectual property has made Information Technology (IT) security management a critical challenge to firms. Security devices, including Intrusion Detections Systems (IDS), are commonly used to help protect these firms from malicious users by identifying the presence of malicious network traffic. However, the actual value of these devices remains uncertain among the IT security community because of the costs associated with the implementation of different monitoring strategies that determine when to inspect potentially malicious traffic and the costs associated with false positive and negative errors. Game theoretic models have proven effective for determining the value of these devices under several conditions where firms and users are modeled as players. However, these models assume that both the firm and attacker have complete information about their opponent and lack the ability to account for more realistic situations where players have incomplete information regarding their opponentu27s payoffs. The proposed research develops an enhanced model that can be used for strategic decision making in IT security management where the firm is uncertain about the useru27s utility of intrusion. By using Harsanyi Transformation Analysis, the model provides the IT security research community with valuable insight into the value of IDS when the firm is uncertain of the incentives and payoffs available to users choosing to hack. Specifically, this dissertation considers two possible types of users with different utility for intrusion to gain further insights about the playersu27 strategies. The firmu27s optimal strategy is to start the game with the expected value of the useru27s utility as an estimate. Under this strategy, the firm can determine the useru27s utility with certainty within one iteration of the game. After the first iteration, the game may be analyzed as a game of perfect information.
机译:公司每年因网络攻击而损失数百万美元,而这些公司所承受的风险正呈指数级增长。货币和知识产权的威胁使信息技术(IT)安全管理成为公司的关键挑战。包括入侵检测系统(IDS)在内的安全设备通常用于通过识别恶意网络流量的存在来帮助保护这些公司免受恶意用户的攻击。但是,由于与确定何时检查潜在恶意流量的不同监视策略的实施相关的成本以及与错误的肯定和否定错误相关的成本,这些设备的实际价值在IT安全社区中仍然不确定。事实证明,博弈论模型可以有效地确定公司和用户被建模为参与者的几种条件下这些设备的价值。但是,这些模型假设公司和攻击者都具有有关其对手的完整信息,并且无法解释更现实的情况,即玩家没有有关其对手收益的完整信息。所提议的研究开发了一种增强的模型,该模型可用于IT安全管理中的战略决策,因为该公司不确定用户的入侵实用程序。通过使用Harsanyi Transformation Analysis,该模型可以为IT安全研究社区提供有关IDS价值的有价值的见解,当公司不确定选择黑客的用户可获得的激励和收益时。具体而言,本文考虑了两种可能的具有不同实用程序的用户类型的入侵,以进一步了解玩家策略。公司的最佳策略是以用户效用的期望值作为估算值​​开始游戏。在这种策略下,公司可以在游戏的一次迭代中确定用户的效用。在第一次迭代之后,可以将游戏分析为完美信息游戏。

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    Moured David Paul;

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