首页> 外文OA文献 >The effects of ownership on corporate performance and dividend payout policy : I. Performance in Founder Owned Firms. II. How Do Involved Owners Influence Dividend Payout Policies?
【2h】

The effects of ownership on corporate performance and dividend payout policy : I. Performance in Founder Owned Firms. II. How Do Involved Owners Influence Dividend Payout Policies?

机译:所有权对公司绩效和股利分配政策的影响:I.创办人公司的绩效。二。所涉所有者如何影响股利支付政策?

摘要

This thesis consists of two separate papers where the first study examines performance in founder owned firms and the second assess how involved owners influence dividend payout policies. All our tests are based on an extensive data set that initially consists of 2671 firm-year observations, and includes 375 firms traded on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (Stockholmsbörsen), over the period 2001 - 2010.In the first study we use several regression analyses to study the effects of founder ownership on performance measured by Return on Net Operating Assets and Tobin‟s Q. Our findings support earlier research in that founder owned firms have a positive influence on performance. Additionally, to the best of our knowledge, we find novel evidence that indicate a somewhat exponential relationship between founder ownership and firm performance. When testing for founders who have positions as CEO, board member and/or chairman, we find that they have a slightly lower positive net effect on firm performance. Finally, we prove that founder owned firms perform better than firms who have long-term owners. To our understanding, this is also a novel empirical finding.In the second study we employ a model consisting of both Logit and Tobit regressions to test how firm owners with firm involvement through being a founder or long-term owner affect cash dividend payout policies. Our findings show that involved owners have more aggressive cash dividend policies than others. When examining different ownership involvement levels, we find that increased ownership involvement leads to more aggressive dividend payout policies. Finally, our results unexpectedly indicate that founder owners who are solely CEO have less aggressive payout preferences than others. These results do not only contribute to the sparse literature on how agency costs affect payout preferences, but are as far as we know, also novel empirical findings.
机译:本文由两篇独立的论文组成,其中第一篇研究考察了创始人拥有的公司的绩效,第二篇研究评估了所有者如何影响股利支付政策。我们所有的测试均基于广泛的数据集,该数据集最初包括2671个公司年的观察数据,包括2001年至2010年期间在斯德哥尔摩证券交易所(Stockholmsbörsen)交易的375家公司。在第一个研究中,我们使用了几种回归分析通过净运营资产收益率和托宾Q来研究创始人所有权对绩效的影响。我们的发现支持了早期研究,即创始人拥有的公司对绩效产生积极影响。此外,据我们所知,我们发现了新颖的证据,表明创始人所有权和公司绩效之间存在指数关系。在对具有首席执行官,董事会成员和/或董事长职位的创始人进行测试时,我们发现他们对公司绩效的正面净效应略低。最后,我们证明创始人拥有的公司的业绩要好于拥有长期所有者的公司。据我们了解,这也是一个新颖的经验发现。在第二项研究中,我们采用由Logit回归和Tobit回归组成的模型,以检验作为公司创始人或长期所有者而有公司参与的公司所有者如何影响现金股利支付政策。我们的研究结果表明,涉案所有者比其他所有者具有更积极的现金股息政策。在检查不同的所有权参与级别时,我们发现所有权参与的增加会导致更积极的股利分配政策。最后,我们的结果出乎意料地表明,仅是CEO的创始人所有者与其他人相比,没有那么积极的支出偏好。这些结果不仅有助于减少关于代理成本如何影响支付偏好的文献,而且据我们所知,也是新颖的经验发现。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号