Time-Inconsistency and Pollution Control: A Macroeconomic Approach.

摘要

A macroeconomic model of optimal profit taxation is extended through incorporation of a tax rate on pollution. Pollution is an inevitable by-product of production. It is assumed that the firms own two different stocks of capital goods. The first one is productive and the second one is nonproductive but cleans pollution. The problem is modelled as a Stackelberg differential game such that the government is the leader; the firms and consumers are the followers playing Nash against each other. The paper elaborates on the investment and tax policies resulting from the open-loop and feedback equilibria and on the question whether the profit tax or the pollution tax should be used as an instrument to reduce pollution. It turns out that in the open-loop equilibria tax policies are time-inconsistent, but lead to higher levels of welfare. Furthermore, it simulates the consequences if new information about the Greenhouse effect is announced.