Federal Railroad Administration, Office of Safety Headquarters Assigned Accident Investigation Report HQ-2006-30: Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF), Lake Side, Nebraska, May 17, 2006

摘要

On May 17, 2006, at approximately 8:30 a.m. MDT, a rear-end collision occurred between two eastbound BNSF Railway Company (BNSF) freight trains operating on the BNSF Powder River Division, Sand Hills Subdivision, at Lakeside, Nebraska, milepost 345.5 (Near Alliance, Nebraska.) The method of operation consists of a Traffic Control System (TCS) arranged to govern movements in either direction across areas of both double and single main track, along with timetable/train orders and special instructions. The TCS is controlled by an operator in the BNSFs Network Operation Center (NOC) located in Fort Worth, Texas. The maximum authorized speed across the area is 60 mph, with a 50 mph restriction for loaded coal trains. Both trains involved in this accident were loaded coal trains. The accident occurred on an area of single main track just west of Lakeside, where double main track begins. The weather conditions at the time of the accident were clear, daylight, and the temperature was about 62 DGF. Damages are estimated at $2.1 million dollars. The two-member train crew of the striking train underwent toxicology testing according to FRA post-accident testing requirements. Both crew members were treated and later released with minor and non life-threatening injuries. There were no hazardous materials released from the rail equipment; however, there were approximately 2,500 gallons of diesel fuel released from the fuel tank of BNSF 8814, the lead locomotive of the striking train. Immediately prior to the collision, eastbound coal Train Symbol C-RWMKCM0-93 was stopped at Lakeside (milepost 344) waiting on a signal to go from single track to double main Track No. 2. A following train, Train Symbol C-ATMSUD0-93 traveling eastbound on single main track, struck the rear end of the stopped train at milepost 345.5. A review of the event recorder data indicated the striking train was traveling at 38 mph when an emergency application of the train brakes was initiated. The emergency application of the brakes was initiated approximately 1,300 feet prior to impact and slowed the train to an estimated speed of 23 mph, at the time of the collision. All post-accident signal tests conducted indicated the signal system was functioning as intended. The probable cause of the accident was the failure of the crew of eastbound Train Symbol C-ATMSUD0-93 to operate their train in accordance with signal indication.