Networked Local Area Networks in Aircraft: Safety, Security, and Certification Issues and Initial Acceptance Criteria (Phases 1 and 2)

摘要

This report presents the results of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) local area network (LAN) research effort addressing potential safety impacts introduced by LANs in aircraft. Interconnecting previously isolated components on aircraft increases the complexity of unintended interactions between components and provides potential new access points that could be exploited to cause harm. This report addresses the potential security vulnerabilities introduced by networking LANs, the safety affects of security failures, and a process for designing and certifying LANs on aircraft to ensure the safety of these new aircraft systems. This report extends the current FAA safety assurance processes into airborne networked environments by leveraging the Biba Integrity Model. It builds upon existing FAA studies that articulate mechanisms to integrate RTCA/DO-178B and common criteria processes for the National Airspace System. This approach creates a safety-oriented airborne networked architecture that is built upon existing DO-178B and Aerospace Recommended Practice 4754 safety mechanisms. This produces results that are a direct analog to existing U.S. Department of Defense policies and processes.