Proliferation Resistance Design of a Plutonium Cycle (Proliferation Resistance Engineering Program:PREP).

摘要

This document describes the proliferation resistance engineering concepts developed to counter the threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons in an International Fuel Service Center (IFSC). The basic elements of an International Fuel Service Center are described. Possible methods for resisting proliferation such as processing alternatives,close-coupling of facilities,process equipment layout,maintenance philosophy,process control,and process monitoring are discussed. Political and institutional issues in providing proliferation resistance for an International Fuel Service Center are analyzed. The conclusions drawn are (1) use-denial can provide time for international response in the event of a host nation takeover. Passive use-denial is more acceptable than active use-denial,and acceptability of active-denial concepts is highly dependent on sovereignty,energy dependence and economic considerations; (2) multinational presence can enhance proliferation resistance;and (3) use-denial must be nonprejudicial with balanced interests for governments and/or private corporations being served. Comparisons between an IFSC as a national facility,an IFSC with minimum multinational effect,and an IFSC with maximum multinational effect show incremental design costs to be less than 2% of total cost of the baseline non-PRE concept facility. The total equipment acquisition cost increment is estimated to be less than 2% of total baseline facility costs. Personnel costs are estimated to increase by less than 10% due to maximum international presence. 46figures, 9tables. (ERA citation 04:021707)