Musicians of Mars in the Deep Attack: Noise or Harmony

摘要

This monograph presents a new concept of division deep battle characterized bydecentralized planning and execution by task organized, combined arms brigades instead of the current Deep Operations Coordination Cell (DOCC) method. The study first argues that current division deep battle doctrine does not support the Army's doctrinal tenets of agility or initiative. The absence of these tenets significantly reduces the likelihood of success in the deep battle. The doctrine fails these tenets by ignoring the fundamentals of combined arms operations, by over-centralizing execution and planning in the DOCC, and by not establishing unity of command. This monograph next examines similarities and contradictions in Army deep, close, and rear battle doctrine. Both close and rear battle doctrine emphasize decentralized execution of combat operations by task organized, combined arms units. On the other hand, deep battle doctrine relies on centralized execution using pure, non-task organized, units. Finally, four historical case studies show the weaknesses in current division deep battle doctrine and demonstrate the potential of decentralization and task organization. A case study from World War 1 and one from the US Army's Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) clearly demonstrate the capability of task organized deep battle units. A battle study from World War 2 and a second BCTP example illuminate the problems of over-centralization, failure to task organize, and lack of unity of command. The study concludes that the best concept for division deep battle is a decentralized approach using task organized brigades. The division should task organize a brigade with all the necessary assets for successful completion of the deep attack. The division should provide a mission, intent, and desired end-state and decentralize further planning and execution to the deep task force comma.