RAND Research Brief: Modifying Federal Civil Service Retirement Incentives

摘要

In recent decades, concerns have been expressed about two related labor force problems in the federal civil service: (1) insufficient turnover among mid- and late-career personnel and (2) the loss of key senior personnel to retirement as soon as they become eligible (generally, age 55). Lack of turnover can clog the promotion pipeline, preventing the hiring or advancement of better- trained or more-skilled individuals. The premature loss of senior personnel can impose significant direct and indirect costs: it is often difficult and time- consuming to find qualified replacements. Some observers have attributed these problems in large part to the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS), which was thought to create 'golden handcuffs' by significantly reducing the value of retirement benefits of those leaving prior to their first age of eligibility. These observers hypothesized that the new, redesigned system called the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS), introduced in 1987, would correct these problematic separation and retirement patterns.