French in Algeria, 1954-1962 Military Success Failure of Grand Strategy

摘要

After the Second World War, movements to separate former colonies from their past rulers, by political means or force, acquired an international momentum that reverberated around the globe. In Algeria, a popular and militant organization advocating complete independence from France was reinvigorated by both the international sentiment and by a perception of French impotence. France had lost a war. Her economy was in ruin, and the government of the Fourth Republic teetered uncertainly. There was a bitter struggle being waged in Indochina. The international humiliation of losing there, especially the dramatic fall of Dien Bien Phu, in concert with a still moribund economy and a fragmented domestic and political scene including a large, aggressive Communist Party, again demonstrated a level of impotence in France that stirred Algerian nationalists. The French Army, disgusted with the results in Indochina, was determined to 'get it right' in Algeria. There would be victory, whatever the cost. Yet, eight years later, Algeria was lost. The French Army suffered 18,000 killed and 65,000 wounded. Four General Officers were court-martialed for an attempted coup. In the words of noted historian Alistair Horne, writing the classic outline of the struggle, A Savage War of Peace: 'The war in Algeria toppled six French prime ministers and the Fourth Republic itself. It came close to bringing down General de Gaulle and his Fifth Republic and confronted metropolitan France with the threat of civil war' In 1962, after eight years of combat, including terrorism on a scale previously unknown in the western world, Algeria became an independent nation. The last vestige of the French Empire had violently gone its own way. How did it happen. What prompted such extreme emotions and subsequent extreme acts. How did the traditionalist and rich-in- magnificent- history French Army become so alienated from mainstream France. How can we avoid the same circumstances.