Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success; Journal article

摘要

It is always easier to get into a conflict than to get out of one. In 1956, for example, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden with French Premier Guy Mollet planned to unseat President Nasser of Egypt and reduce his influence in the region by a combined and coordinated British, French, and Israeli military operation. The French and British leadership conducted detailed, thorough planning to ensure that the costs and risks were reduced to an acceptable minimum. In violation of Clausewitz's guidance, however, the operation was launched without a good idea about termination and what the post-conflict situation would look like. What if landing on the Suez Canal at Port Said and Port Fuad did not force Nasser to step down. Were France and Britain then willing to march on Cairo. Would they have international support for such a move. If they seized Cairo, what would the new Egyptian government look like. Could it stay in power without keeping British and French troops in Egypt for years to come. Would the British and French have world opinion on their side for such an occupation. In the end, Israel launched the attack and British and French forces landed on the Suez Canal. But the operation did not turn out as planned. The United States and Soviets, along with world opinion, forced the British and French to withdraw. President Nasser, rather than being defeated, became the victor and the leader of the Arab cause, while the British and the French lost prestige and influence. How could rational decision makers get it so wrong. This article examines the doctrinal basis for conflict termination planning and provides suggestions and approaches for greater success.