Military Reengineering Between the World Wars

摘要

Incorporating new technological innovations into military organizations has always subjected senior leadership to high degrees of risk, as exemplified by the advent of gunpowder, the steam engine, the telegraph, the radio, or the nuclear bomb: (1) The question is whether comparative historical study can illuminate successful strategies to mitigate such risk as well as caution against problematic approaches. This is a relevant policy question given the perceived military opportunities currently suggested by the rapid growth of computer networks and processing power. Yet while fundamental combat strategies of attrition, annihilation, and counterinsurgency have persisted despite the particular technology involved, fundamental approaches to risky technological incorporation also exist; (2) To address these approaches, this work analyzes the contrasting military responses to the internal combustion engine between World War I and World War II through the lens of reengineering. Reengineering, as the term is used here, denotes a fundamental change in an organization s processes. Such change results from a reasonably 'managed' effort that is made possible by two conditions: the technology required either exists or is within reach, and the goals are reasonably well perceived; (3) Military forces can change, and even transform, in widely contrasting ways. Reengineering has particular relevance because it typically relates to near- and mid-term planning. Some reengineering campaigns are highly planned (i.e., the solutions are worked out in advance), whereas others are accomplished through more iterative innovation, experimentation, and full-scale operational testing. In the latter case, there may be many studies and rigorous analyses, but solutions are more often 'discovered' than deduced a priori.