Joint Operations: Organizational Flaws in Goldwater-Nichols.

摘要

Goldwater-Nichols failed to consider the structural challenges to creating a hybrid organization. The act consolidated power for warfighting to the combatant commander. It improved the joint organization at the strategic level with improved regional campaign and contingency planning. It also improved the oversight and teamwork needed to acquire more interoperable weapon systems. However, it failed to effectively describe how joint organizations would form. The act did not ensure that the force was organized to ensure unity of effort and unity of command. At the highest levels, the combatant commander has unity of command. A more detailed examination of the remaining structure used to organize almost 200,000 American forces reveals an organizational divide. At the lower levels of the CENTCOM structure, little is organized for joint operations. This paper presents an exploration of joint organizational doctrine created from Goldwater-Nichols, a review of hybrid organizational theory, and an examination of the actual Air Force and Army organization in support of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM.