Naval Coastal Warfare Operations from 2000 to Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Deficiencies that Prompted their Addition to the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command

摘要

Over the last decade the importance of Naval Coastal Warfare (NCW) as a viable asset to the United States Navy in the war on terrorism and conflicts in the Middle East has increased. Because the Navy's focus during the decades between the Vietnam War and the attack on the USS Cole was primarily on the former Soviet threat, shallow water forces were considered low priority. As a result, NCW became manned primarily by reservists. From the year 2000 through Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), NCW has operated with deficiencies in manpower, weapons, ammunition, vehicles, communications, and training. By the time OIF was underway NCW had not addressed most of its deficiencies and now NCW units would be asked to perform missions that had never been attempted by NCW units before. Force protection missions at Kuwaiti and Iraqi ports along with a vital mission at the Iraqi oil platforms would need to succeed regardless of the problems encountered by the NCW units. There are four main deficiencies that NCW needs to solve: (1) manpower that is untrained and unsuited for rapid deployment because it is mainly a reserve force; (2) inadequate amounts and types of equipment; (3) communications systems that do not allow communications among all units in theater; and (4) low funding levels. Since very little unclassified historical information on NCW is available, the author presents historical accounts of Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Unit 114 and NCS Group One during routine exercises and OIF to demonstrate their deficiencies. The transition of NCW from a small configuration in early 2000 to a larger and more viable configuration in the Maritime Expeditionary Security Force (a component of Naval Expeditionary Combat Command) has done much to eliminate many of its deficiencies.