PSYOP and the Information Age: Assessing US Army Employment of Psychological Operations in the Contemporary Operating Environment

摘要

As with a local insurgency, the Global War on Terror requires the US and her allies to win the support of neutral, wavering and hostile audiences in addition to defeating an enemy. At the tactical and operational levels of war, those audiences comprise the populations among which the US Army and its enemies operate. The populations face competing demands for support both from US and from its enemies. In what is sometimes referred to as a war of ideas, populations caught between opposing ideological standpoints must, as a minimum, be influenced not to support enemies of the US. From a tactical and operational perspective, in order for the US to achieve operational success, the requirement to influence those in the middle ground has never been more acute. The increased importance of influence in US military operations is matched by an increased opportunity to do so. The Information Age, with its prevalence of communication technology and resultant dissemination of information, presents the US Army with more opportunities than ever before to communicate with, persuade, and influence the populations that comprise this middle ground. In spite of this, Psychological Operations, the US Army's primary capability for influence, is widely misunderstood and under employed. This monograph assesses the operational impact of failure to reflect the increased importance of, and opportunities for, Psychological Operations in modem military operations. By examining Joint and US Army doctrine, US Army organisation and structure, and finally, operational employment of Psyops, the monograph identifies a reluctance to acknowledge the potential of Psychological Operations. The monograph explores the factors that contribute to this reluctance and indicates that it is the inherently psychological nature of warfare, not the context of the Information Age, which demands a greater focus.