Elements of Operational Design in the Planning for the Marianas Campaign in 1944

摘要

Operational art and the operational level of war became a doctrinal focus for the U.S. Army in the 1980s. This focus led to the development of the elements of operational design. These concepts are not new; they were developed during the interwar period prior to World War II at U.S. military staff and war colleges. During this time, however, the military did not recognize the operational level of war or operational art in its doctrine. Even though the concepts were not recognized, the intellectual process permeated the officer education system prior to World War II. Clearly, American officers used operational art during World War II. This monograph examines the extent to which planners within CENPAC used the elements of operational design in the Marianas Campaign, including end-state and objectives, effects, center(s) of gravity, decisive points, direct and indirect action, lines of operation, operational reach, simultaneity and depth, timing and tempo, leverage, balance, anticipation, culmination, and arranging operations. The implications of the study are that as current doctrine evolves, the development, education, and execution of operational concepts used during World War II continue to be useful.