Opium, Insurgency, and U.S. Counterdrug Strategy in Afghanistan: A Case for Change

摘要

Among the many challenges threatening Afghanistan's security and stability, insurgency and illicit drugs have coalesced into a virulent threat to the achievement of U.S. strategic objectives. Long tolerated as a separate and minor problem from the insurgency, opium has grown like a cancerous tumor simultaneously feeding the insurgency while starving legitimate economic growth, weakening the Afghan government, and threatening U.S. national security interests and the long-term viability of a stable, democratic Afghanistan. The failure to discern this symbiotic relationship between the insurgency and the opium trade has proved a major shortcoming of U.S. counterdrug strategy leading to mistakes in its design and operational implementation that persist today. In order to prevail against opium the U.S. must first, correctly understand the history, background and interactions of the opium-insurgency nexus, second, fix the flaws in its counterdrug approach by eliminating eradication and strengthening alternative development and interdiction, and third, augment Afghan counterdrug forces with U.S. military forces until they are capable of operating independently. This research paper presents the historical, structural, economic, and security causes underlying opium's resilience. It outlines the opium economy's functions, and highlights the nature and effects of the opium-insurgency nexus on U.S. and Afghan efforts to establish functioning state institutions and expand government control. And finally, the paper analyzes U.S. counterdrug efforts and proposes changes in focus and resource allocation.