Deterrence in the Israeli-Iranian Strategic Standoff

摘要

One of the central concerns of current U.S. foreign policy is that Iran will develop a nuclear weapons capability which it could use to threaten the security of other regional states. The entire history of the Iranian nuclear technology program, including previous efforts to keep the enrichment effort secret, suggests that Tehran will almost certainly continue to pursue a nuclear weapons capability despite some reassuring factors noted in the 2007 NIE. This article forecasts a serious chance of failure in the current American and global efforts to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons regardless of whether such attempts are pursued through the use of economic and political sanctions or air strikes. It is doubtful that either option can guarantee the end of the Iranian nuclear program for reasons to be discussed later. The more radical option of air strikes has a significant potential to undermine other western goals in the Middle East, including stabilizing Iraq, while failing to do much more than delay the Iranian weapons program for a few years at best. An alternative possibility is that Israel as a potential Iranian strategic adversary will be able to establish a system of deterrence and missile defense based on a combination of technology it already possesses or is developing. Such a system would seriously limit (perhaps even overcome) the chances of a successful Iranian strike against Israel, while raising the cost of even an unsuccessful attack to apocalyptic levels for the Tehran regime. Ideally, Israeli-sponsored deterrence will not have to be maintained indefinitely if the United States and Europe can generate a diplomatic strategy for managing Iranian power, especially if a more moderate leadership eventually emerges in Iran. In this regard, some (but not all) Israeli leaders have not ruled out the possibility that the United States can achieve important diplomatic gains that will benefit Israel in negotiations with Iran.