Don't Supersize. Simplifying Defense Acquisition Reform.

摘要

In early 2009, shortly after the latest defense acquisition reform legislation, the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) was signed by President Obama, I decided that as a defense acquisition professional, it would be good to study the history of such reform. I had been taunted by the old adage from high school history class -- that those who do not study the past are doomed to repeat it. My research found a great deal of history, with a great deal of it repeated. The pattern was this: studies identified problems, panels proposed solutions, the government directed reforms. Two of the first reform studies I read referred to over 200 other studies, panels, and reports. What surprised me was how many of the ideas generated by this excess of think- tanking were implemented. Defense acquisition reform is that rare subject that garners broad bipartisan as well as cross-government support. WSARA, for example, passed both the House and Senate unanimously, despite strong partisanship on virtually every other issue. I wondered: 'Why is defense acquisition reform so uniquely persuasive -- and why do these much-agreed-upon reforms appear not to be working.' The metrics for our largest weapons systems show a near-unbroken trend of unexpected cost and schedule growth trailing back to 1950, despite more than a dozen attempts to reform the system and eliminate the trend. Perhaps, in our desperation, we failed to understand some fundamental causes and have over-engineered solutions. While many reforms do relieve stress in the system, collectively they add stress and steer the acquisition system down the path that our tax code has taken -- that of extreme complexity. To rebalance, we should ask ourselves: Which remedies will have the broadest positive effects but require relatively simple and concise actions. How do we nudge rather than pummel ourselves to positive results.