The Soviet Policy Towards Indonesia on the West Irian and the Malaysian Disputes

摘要

Conclusions: Soviet support of the Indonesian confrontation with Malaysia on the model of support on the West Irian dispute would have the following costs: it would disturb the detente with the United States (which did not exist earlier), and it would foreclose the possibility of useful Soviet relations with Malaysia in the future. It would also force the Soviet Union to choose sides between two new states and thus incur disapproval of such new states as the United Arab Republic which already recognizes Malaysia. Open approval of Indonesian dispatch of guerrillas into Malaysia would place the Soviet Union in a position of sanctioning the 'export of revolution,' a practice the Soviets publicly disclaim. Open opposition to the Indonesian policy would prove the Chinese contention that the Soviet Union has no genuine interest in national liberationist movements and would guarantee Chinese dominant influence in Indonesia. The Soviets would run counter to the policy of the Communist Party of Indonesia which has identified itself with the confrontation policy. The Soviets have, therefore, adopted a compromise policy of grudging support for the Indonesians on the Malaysian issue.