'Offsets', Standardization, and Trade Liberalization in NATO.

摘要

The paper reports the results of a short-term study for the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs in the Department of State. It draws from and supplements an earlier study done for the Air Force, which deals with 'offsets' for NATO procurement of an airborne warning and control system. While addressing some of the same issues treated in that study, the present paper focuses on one particular aspect of the earlier piece--trade liberalization--as a component of U.S. policy in NATO for dealing with the recurring problem of 'offsets.' The offset problem arises as a central issue in connection with efforts to rationalize and standardize forces, equipment, and operational capabilities within the alliance. The aim of the present paper is to elaborate on the linkage between trade policy issues, on the one hand, and issues of standardization and 'offsets,' on the other. A method is suggested for applying this linkage empirically so as to identify potential U.S. civil sector procurement from the other NATO countries that might 'offset' NATO military procurement from the U.S. in the future.