Large Bilateral Reductions in Superpower Nuclear Weapons

摘要

Two alternative states with arms control agreements with significant verification provisions are examined. The first, minimum deterrence, reduces each superpower's nuclear weapons to a few hundred each and prohibits strategic defense. The second, zero-nuclear-weapons deterrence, abolishes deployed nuclear weapons; but, the superpowers maintain the capability to assemble and deploy a few hundred nuclear weapons on short notice. Strategic defense is encouraged to decrease the incentive to violate the arms control agreements. The three states are considered the initial conditions and four analyses are performed: potential attack (either a false alarm, an accidental attack, or an intentional attack) stability, major superpower crisis stability, arms procurement stability (the incentives to procure weapons which, although not in violation of the arms control agreements, may be destabilizing), and arms control stability (the incentives to violate the agreements). The thesis results provide insight into strategic behavior in the current and the two alternative states. First, the current and the zero-nuclear-weapons states are generally more stable than minimum deterrence. Second, the effects of uncertainty on procurement decision-making are relatively minor, and, therefore, the value of information is not large. Third, the strategic defense assumption for each state is very important.