Evolution of U.S. Army Doctrine: from Active Defense to Airland Battle and Beyond

摘要

This study explains the recent evolution of U.S. Army doctrine. During the lasttwo decades, the Army revised its capstone manual--FM 100-5, Operations--three times: in 1976, 1982, and 1986. A fourth revision is underway in 1991. This thesis chronicles the change in doctrine by analyzing the differences between the four versions of FM 100-5. It then employs five external factors (the change in technology, strategy, threat, domestic political context, and resource base) and four internal factors (the Army's organizational interests, the process of doctrine development, the bureaucratic politics within the Army, and the cognitive psychology of the Army's leaders) to explain the recent change in doctrine. The thesis concludes that in 1976 constraining external factors forced the Army to adopt a doctrine that was at odds with its internal needs. The early Reagan years, in contrast, permitted a return to a doctrine that better served the Army's interests. Though environmental changes call that doctrine into question in the nineties, the Army resists significant changes to a doctrine that satisfies its internal needs. The U.S. Army's current doctrine addresses organizational preferences better than operational requirements.