Analyzing the Tactical Risk Decision: Does the Commander Need Help withVersatility

摘要

This monograph proposes an answer to the question: Can the current tacticalmission risk analysis process adequately support the doctrine tenet of versatility. The conclusion is that true versatility in unfamiliar operations may require a more structured approach, or possibly decision aids for commanders to analyze effectively and then monitor course of action risk factors. Doctrine holds the tactical commander solely responsible for analyzing and weighing risk when he selects his course of action in the military decision-making process. In both theory and doctrine, this cost-benefit analysis is purely a reflection of the commander's personal preparation, experience, and competence. Hence, his intuitive judgement of risk is rarely structured or adequately explained to his subordinates. This process is highly vulnerable to the loss of the commander and, in an era of new and challenging military environments, is highly dependent on the relevance of the commander's experience. This monograph investigates the component of risk analysis in the art of tactical command as discussed by theoretical works and current/emerging doctrine. After establishing the theoretical and doctrinal foundation, the analysis explores the adequacy of the current process in the new era of versatile operations. Issues include distinguishing between the calculated risk and a gamble, the impact of rules of engagement (ROE), and the potential conflict between tactical and operational/strategic objectives. Finally, the monograph proposes a structured approach for risk analysis as part of the commander's estimate. Ultimately, the subjective judgement of risk is purely in the art of command. However, the commander's perception of key risks to mission accomplishment and his force is integral to his intent.