Nonproliferation vs. Industrial Competitiveness: U.S. Export Controls and theDual-Use Machine Tool Industry

摘要

This thesis examines the tradeoff between nonproliferation objectives andcommercial interests regarding controls on American exports of dual-use technologies. It also examines the tension between both unilateral and multilateral export controls for dual-use machine tools. Strong unilateral export controls reduce the competitiveness of the U.S. machine tool industry, while relaxation of controls threatens to increase the spread of weapons of mass destruction by making enabling technologies available to developing states. Given the increasing globalization of defense production, multilateral export controls offer the best opportunity to retard the spread of sensitive technologies, especially if these controls are led by a strong state that is prepared to guide their implementation, verification, and enforcement. In order to influence the behavior of target countries and to demonstrate American resolve for the principles of nonproliferation, controls should include both sanctions and positive incentives. The United States should lead multilateral export control regimes. If controls are properly applied, opportunities for commercial exports may expand in the long term. The case of Iraq provides important insights into the potential for nuclear and dual-use technology proliferation in the absence of well-enforced controls. The study uses the insights to argue for stronger controls, data-sharing, and monitoring to slow the spread of sensitive dual-use technology to other rogue states in the Middle East, particulary Iran.