True Tactical Reserves in Striking Force Operation: PILFERY of Combat Power atthe Line of Contact

摘要

This monograph considers the utility of constituting both a striking force and asupplemental tactical reserve when conducting a mobile defense. It considers the conclusions of a 1993 Combined Arms Command (CAC) study of the mobile defense which recommended that both an offensively oriented striking force and a reserve be maintained. This monograph considers whether withholding two maneuver forces from the initial battle at the line of contact reduces or increases the risk of defeat in the mobile defense. The monograph first examines the reserve in classical theory and practice to establish the fundamental nature of tactical reserves. It then explores the evolution of the practice of withholding forces from the initial battle in the modern era, with particular emphasis on American military doctrine. The paper offers two historical case studies in which numerically inferior forces conducted mobile defenses: the German Army Group Don at the Donetz River in 1943 and the Israeli Northern Command on the Golan Heights in 1973. These studies consider commanders' ability to withhold forces from the line of contact when their forces have insufficient combat power to execute an area defense. (RWJ).