New Differential Fault Analysis on Trivium Based on Setup-Time Violations

摘要

This paper presents new differential fault analysis (DFA) on a stream cipher Trivium based on setup-time violations. Trivium is a hardware-oriented synchronous stream cipher, designed by De Canniere and Preneel in 2005. In 2008, Hojsfk and Rudolf first presented differential fault analysis of Trivium and proposed two types of DFA on Trivium. Setup-time violations are common fault injection methods for hardware implementations. We show that we have succeeded in injecting faults into FPGA on SASEBO-GII in which Trivium is implemented, and in obtaining 147 out of 288 secret bits with 93 fault injections at different rounds. According to our experiments, we found it is difficult to inject 1-bit errors into random positions of the registers of Trivium at a specific round that was proposed in the previous work of Hojsik and Rudolf.