Research involving human embryonic stem cells promises the prospect of great medical benefits, including for example the possibility of cell-based therapies for degenerative diseases such as diabetes, Alzheimer's and Parkinson's disease and the creation of autologous transplants by therapeutic cloning, minimising the risk of immunological rejection. However, the derivation of human embryonic stem cells necessarily entails research upon the human embryo and the destruction of the embryo from which they are taken, and thus the embryonic stem cell debate has reopened the discussion about when (if ever) and on what basis is embryo research permissible. Whilst the debate about embryo research in the 1980s and 1990s centred upon the increased knowledge that could be gained by embryo research in relation to reproductive medicine, particularly assisted reproductive medicine, the advent of embryonic stem cell research has shifted that focus to research aimed at increasing the knowledge of medical science in areas totally distinct from reproductive medicine, including, for example, transplantation. Despite that shift, the fundamental questions remain. These concern the ontological and moral status of the embryo and the uses to which it may be put. Is it, for example, a person or potential person with rights, or is it, at the other extreme a mere laboratory artefact to be exploited for the benefit of persons extant? Is it acceptable to create human embryos specifically for research with no intention of using them in assisted reproductive techniques or does this take instrumentalised use beyond morally acceptable limits. How does the use of human embryos in research impact upon the value accorded to human dignity?
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