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The Downs-Thomson Paradox with responsive transit service

机译:唐斯-汤姆森悖论与响应式公交服务

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摘要

Downs (1962) and Thomson (1977) suggested that highway capacity expansion may produce counterproductive effects on the two-mode (auto and transit) transport system (Downs-Thomson Paradox). This paper investigates the occurrence of this paradox when transit authority can have different economic objectives (profit-maximizing or breakeven) and operating schemes (frequency, fare, or both frequency and fare). For various combinations of economic objectives and operating schemes, the interaction between highway expansion and transit service is explored, as well as its impact on travelers' mode choices and travel utilities. Further, for each combination, the conditions for occurrence of the Downs-Thomson Paradox are established. We show that the paradox never occurs when transit authority is profit-maximizing, but it is inevitable when the transit authority is running to maximize travelers' utility while maintaining breakeven. This is because the former transit authority tends to enhance transit service (e.g., raise frequency or reduce fare) when facing an expanded highway; and on the contrary, the latter tends to compromise transit service (e.g., reduce frequency or raise fare). Both analytical and numerical examples are provided to verify the theoretical results.
机译:Downs(1962)和Thomson(1977)认为,高速公路的容量扩张可能会对双模式(汽车和公交)运输系统产生适得其反的影响(Downs-Thomson悖论)。本文研究了当交通当局可以有不同的经济目标(利润最大化或盈亏平衡)和运营方案(频率、票价或频率和票价)时,这种悖论的发生。针对经济目标和运营方案的各种组合,探讨了高速公路扩建与交通服务之间的相互作用,及其对出行方式选择和出行效用的影响。此外,对于每个组合,都建立了唐斯-汤姆逊悖论的发生条件。我们表明,当交通当局实现利润最大化时,悖论永远不会发生,但当交通当局在保持盈亏平衡的同时最大限度地提高旅行者的效用时,这是不可避免的。这是因为前交通当局在面对扩建的高速公路时倾向于加强交通服务(例如,提高班次或降低票价);相反,后者往往会损害公交服务(例如,减少班次或提高票价)。通过算例和数值算例验证了理论结果。

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