首页> 外文期刊>Mathematical Problems in Engineering: Theory, Methods and Applications >Equilibrium Decisions on Pricing and the Greenness Degree in Supply Chains under Single- and Cross-Distribution Channels of Green and Nongreen Products and Government Subsidies
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Equilibrium Decisions on Pricing and the Greenness Degree in Supply Chains under Single- and Cross-Distribution Channels of Green and Nongreen Products and Government Subsidies

机译:绿色和非绿色产品单一分销渠道和交叉分销渠道下供应链定价与绿色度的均衡决策与政府补贴

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摘要

Rapid economic growth and industrialization have brought us material abundance and greater convenience, while also causing socio-environmental problems such as the rapid depletion of resources, unexpected natural disasters, and environmental destruction. For these reasons, environmental issues have attracted public and governmental attention around the world over the past few decades. As a result, environmental sustainability has become a critical indicator for evaluating the success and efficiency of supply chain management schemes. For a sustainable supply chain, many governments are employing subsidy policies to encourage consumers to purchase environment-friendly (green) products. This article considers a supply chain composed of two competing manufacturers and two retailers. The first manufacturer produces a green product, while the second manufacturer produces a nongreen product. Each of the two retailers can sell only a green product, only a nongreen product, or both green and nongreen products. In the market, consumers purchasing the first manufacturer’s green products can receive certain subsidies from the government. The amounts of the government subsidies that a consumer receives depend on the greenness degree of the product. Using a three-stage Stackelberg game framework, this article discusses equilibrium decisions on pricing and greenness for four different distribution channel structures. Major findings of this study reveal that (i) the government subsidy has a positive impact on the greenness degree and the demand for green products; (ii) the government subsidy level depends on the manufacturers’ distribution channel strategy types; and (iii) the greater the environmentally negative impact of a green product, the lower the level of the government subsidy paid for purchasing green products. Based on these findings, this article suggests that policymakers focus on establishing the policies that encourage the purchase of green products for the sustainability of a society and a supply chain.
机译:经济的快速增长和工业化给我们带来了物质的丰富和更大的便利,同时也造成了资源迅速枯竭、自然灾害和环境破坏等社会环境问题。由于这些原因,在过去的几十年里,环境问题引起了全世界公众和政府的关注。因此,环境可持续性已成为评估供应链管理计划成功和效率的关键指标。为了实现可持续的供应链,许多政府正在采用补贴政策来鼓励消费者购买环保(绿色)产品。本文考虑由两个相互竞争的制造商和两个零售商组成的供应链。第一家制造商生产绿色产品,而第二家制造商生产非绿色产品。两家零售商中的每一个都只能销售一种绿色产品,只能销售一种非绿色产品,或者同时销售绿色和非绿色产品。在市场上,消费者购买第一家厂家的绿色产品,可以从政府获得一定的补贴。消费者获得的政府补贴金额取决于产品的绿色程度。本文使用三阶段的Stackelberg博弈框架,讨论了四种不同分销渠道结构的定价和绿色度的均衡决策。本研究的主要发现显示:(i)政府补贴对绿色程度和绿色产品需求有正向影响;(ii)政府补贴水平取决于制造商的分销渠道策略类型;及(iii)绿色产品对环境的负面影响越大,购买绿色产品的政府补贴水平就越低。基于这些发现,本文建议政策制定者专注于制定鼓励购买绿色产品的政策,以实现社会和供应链的可持续性。

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