The paradox of (Inter)net neutrality: An experiment on ex-ante antitrust regulation

摘要

Net neutrality has been the most relevant and heavily debated Internet regulation policy of the last decade. Net neutrality aims to prohibit discrimination between data packages in terms of content, origin, destination, or type of equipment used. However, the Big Tech companies, sheltered by the net neutrality policy, have flourished. They now have the power to exclude minor companies, and therefore their contents, from the Internet market in de facto defiance of the net neutrality principle. Academic results regarding this net neutrality paradox are still ambiguous. To represent the current Internet market distortions and analyze a potential tool to adjust and strengthen the net neutrality principle, an economic experiment based on an extended version of the dictator game was conducted. In particular, the effect of an ex-ante control and sanctioning mechanism on the collusive behavior of big companies was studied. The regulation mechanism proves effective, significatively reducing the abusive behavior of large Internet companies. This result contributes to the debate on net neutrality, reinforcing the idea that policymakers, given the current asymmetric Internet market structure, should revise and update net neutrality regulations.