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Solution of a pollution sensitive EOQ model under fuzzy lock leadership game approach

机译:模糊锁领导博弈方法下的污染敏感EOQ模型求解

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This paper considers pollution sensitive economic order quantity (EOQ) inventory model for items under several styles of managerial leadership via lock fuzzy game theoretic approach. The decision-maker (DM) controls several cost components by playing as Player 1 in one side and the consumers who may accept/reject those items (unwilling to buy those commodities) stand as Player 2 in the other side. At first, we develop a new pollution function through modeling, then we study a real case study in a brick factory. Based on this case study, we formulate a cost minimization EOQ model where the environmental pollution is incorporated. Because of the fuzzy flexibility of the model parameters, we also develop a fuzzy mathematical model by considering the demand and all cost parameters of the inventory system as triangular lock fuzzy numbers. Then, we develop a game problem by applying 5-stage leadership style employing several key vectors into the model itself. Also, we reformulate the proposed model into bi-objective game model with different strategies and solve it by an existing methodology. The problem has been solved for crisp, general fuzzy, bi-objective strategic fuzzy, and models of several leadership styles also. Numerical results show that for cooperative game, inventory cost function reaches its minimum rather than the non-cooperative game with the use of proper keys of the fuzzy locks. A comparative study between proposed method and existing method has been done for showing the superiority of the proposed methodology. Finally, in the sensitivity analysis, graphical illustrations are made to justify the new approach and a conclusive remark has been added followed by scope of future work of the proposed study.
机译:本文采用锁模糊博弈理论方法研究了几种管理领导风格下物品的污染敏感经济订货量(EOQ)库存模型。决策者 (DM) 通过在一方扮演玩家 1 来控制多个成本构成,而可能接受/拒绝这些物品(不愿意购买这些商品)的消费者在另一方扮演玩家 2。首先,我们通过建模开发新的污染函数,然后在砖厂研究一个真实的案例研究。基于该案例研究,我们制定了一个将环境污染纳入成本最小化的EOQ模型。由于模型参数的模糊灵活性,我们还通过将库存系统的需求和所有成本参数视为三角锁模糊数来开发模糊数学模型。然后,我们通过在模型本身中应用使用几个关键向量的 5 阶段领导风格来开发一个博弈问题。此外,我们还将所提出的模型重新表述为具有不同策略的双目标博弈模型,并采用现有方法进行求解。这个问题已经解决了清晰的、一般的模糊的、双目标的战略模糊的,以及几种领导风格的模型。数值结果表明,在使用适当的模糊锁键的情况下,合作博弈的库存成本函数达到最小值,而不是非合作博弈。对所提方法与现有方法进行了比较研究,验证了所提方法的优越性。最后,在敏感性分析中,用图形说明新方法的合理性,并添加了结论性评论,然后介绍了拟议研究的未来工作范围。

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