The Involution of Resource Inputs and the Loosening of Ties between Local Government and Peasants in China: Dilemmas of Grassroots Governance under the “Multiple Prioritized Tasks” Regime

摘要

The Chinese central government has greatly increased the resources dedicated to the countryside since its abolition of agricultural taxes and fees but has also assigned many more tasks to the local governments. County government, which had previously adopted a “single prioritized task” approach to governance, now has transitioned to a “multiple prioritized tasks” approach. This transformation has not only jeopardized the capacity of township governments to coordinate rural projects, but has also changed the earlier performance evaluation system from one that emphasized results to one that increasingly emphasizes “processes. The relationship between the county and township governments has become increasingly bureaucratized and ossified. This has given rise to two problems. On the one hand, the increases in resource inputs have not come with a significant improvement of efficiency in local governance, which has resulted in involution in terms of returns to resource inputs. On the other hand, increasing bureaucratization has imposed mounting burdens on the administrative system. As a result, there has been a deteriorating relationship between the local government and the peasants, in which the former simply fails to respond to the villagers’ real needs and aspirations. To break through the problem of local governments becoming increasingly detached from and irrelevant to the villages, local governments should be given greater autonomy and flexibility. The central government should allow them greater autonomy in the use of resources in order to rebuild an organic relationship with the peasants by more appropriate uses of the new resources allocated to them.