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Technology's Unrealistic Promise The U.S. Army in the 1950s and Technological Determinism

机译:美国陆军在技术的不切实际的承诺1950年代和技术决定论

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摘要

U.S. Army leaders in the 1950s, such as Generals Matthew Ridgway and Maxwell Taylor, looked to technology to improve the Army's position under President Dwight Eisenhower's New Look defense policy. The U.S. Army invested more in its missile program in the later part of the 1950s than all other munitions combined. U.S. Army leaders sought to show that through technical triumphs and organizational changes that the U.S. ground force was still relevant in the atomic age. However, their reliance on technical success did not consider the policy and economic constraints of the New Look defense policy. Technological success alone could not overcome these limits. Military technology exists in a richer political and social context, and U.S. Army leaders' efforts to rely on technological success to overcome the limits of their context failed to directly address the political and economic realities of the New Look defense policy.
机译:美国陆军领导人在1950年代,如将军马修泰勒Ridgway和麦克斯韦,看起来在技术改善军队的地位艾森豪威尔总统的新防御政策。导弹项目的后期1950年代比其他所有弹药的总和。领导人试图表明,通过技术成功和组织的变化,美国地面部队仍然是相关的原子的年龄。不考虑政策和经济了吗约束的新国防政策。技术成功就不能克服这些限制。丰富的政治和社会背景,美国军队领导人的努力依靠科技成功克服背景的限制未能直接解决政治和经济现实的新防御政策。

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