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Endogenous context in a dictator game

机译:独裁者游戏中的内源环境

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摘要

The early characterization of humans as narrowly self-interested agents has unraveled in recent decades due to advances in the behavioral sciences. There is convincing evidence that peoples' preferences and decisions are shaped by their relationship with others and the context of their interactions. While previous studies have demonstrated that context can shape preferences, we consider whether people endogenously shape their own preferences by choosing their context. Using a one-shot game, we explore whether dictators actively seek or avoid information regarding the deservingness of their recipient.. We find that four out of five dictators endogenously choose to close the social distance gap by finding out the deservingness level of their recipients, and they act on that frame - the deserving get more, the undeserving get less. We further show that the decision to seek more information about the recipient is systematic, explained by the cultural worldviews of the dictator. (C) 2016 Published by Elsevier Inc.
机译:由于行为科学的进步,近几十年来,人类的早期表征已被狭窄的自身利益药物揭示。有令人信服的证据表明,人们的偏好和决定是由他们与他人的关系及其互动背景所塑造的。尽管以前的研究表明上下文可以塑造偏好,但我们考虑人们是否通过选择背景来塑造自己的偏好。我们使用一次性游戏,我们探索独裁者是积极寻求或避免有关其接收者应得性的信息。我们发现,五分之四的独裁者中有四分之一通过发现其应得的接收者的应得的水平来缩小社会距离差距,他们在那个框架上行动 - 应得的更多,不必要的变得更少。我们进一步表明,寻求有关接收者的更多信息的决定是系统性的,由独裁者的文化世界观解释。 (C)2016年由Elsevier Inc.发布

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