首页> 外文期刊>Journal of the European Economic Association >DISTRIBUTIONAL PREFERENCES IN LARGER GROUPS: KEEPING UP WITH THE JONESES AND KEEPING TRACK OF THE TAILS
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DISTRIBUTIONAL PREFERENCES IN LARGER GROUPS: KEEPING UP WITH THE JONESES AND KEEPING TRACK OF THE TAILS

机译:较大群体的分配偏好:跟上琼斯并跟踪尾巴

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摘要

We study distributional preferences in larger "societies". We conduct experiments via Mechanical Turk, in which subjects choose between two income distributions, each with seven (or more) individuals, with hypothetical incomes that aim to approximate the actual distribution of income in the United States. In contrast to prior work, our design allows us to flexibly capture the particular distributional concerns of subjects. Consistent with standard maximin (Rawlsian) preferences, subjects select distributions in which the bottom individual's income is higher (but show little regard for lower incomes above the bottom ranking). In contrast to standard models, however, we find that subjects select distributions that lower the top individual's income, but not other high incomes. Finally, we provide evidence of "locally competitive" preferences-in most experimental sessions, subjects select distributions that lower the income of the individual directly above them, whereas the income of the individual two positions above has little effect on subjects' decisions. Our findings suggest that theories of inequality aversion should be adapted to account for individuals' aversion to "topmost" and "local" disadvantageous inequality.
机译:我们研究较大的“社会”中的分布偏好。我们通过机械土耳其人进行实验,在该实验中,受试者在两个收入分配之间选择七个(或更多)个人,并具有假设收入,旨在近似于美国的实际收入分布。与先前的工作相反,我们的设计使我们能够灵活捕捉受试者的特定分销问题。与标准最大化(Rawlsian)偏好一致,受试者选择最底部个人收入更高的分布(但对低于底部排名的较低收入的关注很少)。但是,与标准模型相反,我们发现受试者选择了降低个人收入的分布,而不是其他高收入。最后,我们提供了大多数实验会议中“本地竞争”偏好的证据,主题选择了降低个人收入直接的分布,而个人两个职位的收入对受试者的决定几乎没有影响。我们的发现表明,不平等厌恶理论应适应个人对“最高”和“本地”不平等的厌恶。

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