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The reimbursement of new medical technologies in German inpatient care: What factors explain which hospitals receive innovation payments?

机译:德国住院护理中新医疗技术的报销:什么因素解释了哪家医院接受创新付款?

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Most hospital payment systems based on diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) provide payments for newly approved technologies. In Germany, they are negotiated between individual hospitals and health insurances. The aim of our study is to assess the functioning of temporary reimbursement mechanisms. We used multilevel logistic regression to examine factors at the hospital and state levels that are associated with agreeing innovation payments. Dependent variable was whether or not a hospital had successfully negotiated innovation payments in 2013 (n= 1532). Using agreement data of the yearly budget negotiations between each German hospital and representatives of the health insurances, the study comprises all German acute hospitals and innovation payments on all diagnoses. In total, 32.9% of the hospitals successfully negotiated innovation payments in 2013. We found that the chance of receiving innovation payments increased if the hospital was located in areas with a high degree of competition and if they were large, had university status and were private for-profit entities. Our study shows an implicit self-controlled selection of hospitals receiving innovation payments. While implicitly encouraging safety of patient care, policy makers should favour a more direct and transparent process of distributing innovation payments in prospective payment systems.
机译:大多数基于诊断相关组(DRG)的医院支付系统为新批准的技术提供支付。在德国,它们是由各医院和医疗保险公司协商达成的。我们研究的目的是评估临时补偿机制的功能。我们使用多水平逻辑回归分析了医院和州层面与同意创新支付相关的因素。因变量是医院是否在2013年成功协商创新付款(n=1532)。利用德国各医院和医疗保险代表之间年度预算谈判的协议数据,该研究包括所有德国急症医院和所有诊断的创新付款。2013年,总共有32.9%的医院成功地协商了创新付款。我们发现,如果医院位于竞争激烈的地区,如果医院规模较大,具有大学地位,并且是私营营利实体,那么获得创新报酬的机会就会增加。我们的研究显示,接受创新报酬的医院存在一种内隐的自我控制选择。在暗中鼓励患者护理安全的同时,政策制定者应该支持在未来的支付系统中分配创新支付的更直接、更透明的流程。

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