Blocking, attracting, imposing, and aligning: The utility of ASEAN forest and environmental regime policies for strong member states

摘要

Highlights?A framework for regional cooperation within the theory of interest, global and regional regimes.?The political functions of ASEAN forest and environmental regimes for member states.?Members use regimes to attract funding, to block annoying agreement, imposing standard, and to ally with other members.International institutions, including ‘global regimes’ and ‘regional regimes’, address an increasing number of environmental issues. While in the past much attention was given to global regimes, a plethora of regional institutions and organizations (regional regimes) and their environmental policies have recently gained more momentum in political practice and attention in scholarship. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is one such regime, and is actively developing its own policies relating to (e.g.) forests and the environment. These policies necessarily have to be useful for the regime’s member states; however, we further argue, that within the member states the regime’s policies especially have to be useful for specific member states’bureaucracies, because it is they who actually develop the policies on behalf of the member states. Further, this paper aims to analyse the utility of ASEAN’s forest and environmental policy for specific member states and their responsible bureaucracies. Our analytical framework builds on regional regime theory, bureaucratic politics, and concepts of actor’s utility and interests. It differentiates the utility of the regional regime policies into several functions: (i)blockingunpleasant international initiatives, (ii)attractinginternational political or financial support, (iii)imposingrules on other member states, and (iv)aligningthe interests of member states against external political opponents. Our results indicate that ASEAN’s environmental and forest policies serve all four functions. For instance, through ASEAN structures, Indonesia isblockingstrict CITES (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora) regulation of ramin wood to maintain existing ramin protections and business, and the ASEAN Biodiversity Centre is found to be instrumental inblockingambitious claims towards biodiversity from international actors. In addition, Malaysia and Singapore haveimposedan ASEAN wildfire haze pollution agreement onto other member states in order to protect their directly affected interests in air quality and air traffic. ASEAN is alsoattractingto its members various international environmental funds in areas including climate change, community-based forestry, and sustainable peatland management. Last, member states under ASEAN activelyaligntheir positions in international climate negotiations as well as global forest deliberations to enhance their influence. We conclude that policies developed within regional regimes such as ASEAN are aligned with the interests of stronger member states, and their bureaucracies in particular. It remains unclear, however, how powerful these actors need to be in order to make this customization of regime policies valid for them. The results suggest that not only a potential hegemon, but also second or third powers may have this option. At the same time, member states’ activities do not seem to be conducted by states as unitary actors; instead, issue-specific actions are based on the interests of issue-relevant bureaucracies, which are in charge of representing a given member state in a given field of a regime’s policy.